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Optimal Financial Knowledge and Wealth Inequality
Abstract
We show that financial knowledge is a key determinant of wealth inequality in a stochastic life cycle model
with endogenous financial knowledge accumulation, where financial knowledge enables individuals to better
allocate lifetime resources in a world of uncertainty and imperfect insurance. Moreover, because of how the
US social insurance system works, better-educated individuals have most to gain from investing in financial
knowledge. Our parsimonious specification generates substantial wealth inequality relative to a one-asset
saving model and one in which returns on wealth depend on portfolio composition alone. We estimate that
30–40 percent of retirement wealth inequality is accounted for by financial knowledge.
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We show that financial knowledge is a key determinant of wealth in-
equality in a stochastic life cycle model with endogenous financial
knowledge accumulation, where financial knowledge enables individ-
uals to better allocate lifetime resources in a world of uncertainty and
imperfect insurance. Moreover, because of how the US social insur-
ance system works, better-educated individuals have most to gain from
investing in financial knowledge. Our parsimonious specification gen-
erates substantial wealth inequality relative to a one-asset saving model
and one in which returns on wealth depend on portfolio composition
alone. We estimate that 30–40 percent of retirement wealth inequality
is accounted for by financial knowledge.
I. Introduction
Americans are increasingly being asked to manage their own financial
well-being during their working years as well as in retirement. This pro-
An earlier version of this paper was circulated as an NBER working paper (Lusardi,
Michaud, and Mitchell 2013). The research reported herein was performed pursuant to
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cess has been hastened by the movement away from defined benefit pen-
sions toward defined contribution (DC) plans. In 1980, about 40 percent
of private-sector pension contributions went to DC plans, but two de-
cades later, almost 90 percent of these contributions flowed to DC plans
(mainly 401(k); see Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2007). At the same time,
financial markets have become more complex, expanding the set of in-
struments that households can use to save and invest. The trend toward
more individual responsibility means that people’s financial decisions
made early in life can have long-term consequences. For example, if
young workers direct their pension contributions to equities instead of
money market funds, this can result in quite different accumulation lev-
els. Moreover, in this new environment, investments in financial knowl-
edge can have important consequences for retirement well-being by in-
fluencing people’s ability to save and invest. When the decision to invest
in financial literacy alters life cycle wealth profiles, individuals with sim-
ilar initial circumstances can end up holding very different amounts of
retirement wealth.1 To the extent that this mechanism is at work, under-
standing it will help explain wealth inequality.
This paper argues that financial knowledge itself should be modeled
as an endogenous choice variable akin to human capital investment. The
mechanism we posit is that financial knowledge can enable individuals
to better allocate resources over their lifetimes in a world of uncertainty
and imperfect insurance. Our approach uses an explicit multiperiod
theoretical model that allows us to explore two important questions:
1 Wealth levels vary considerably across both workers and retirees; see Moore and Mitch-
ell (2000) and Venti and Wise (2001).
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(1) What forces shape financial knowledge accumulation over the life
cycle? (2) How much wealth inequality can be attributable to resulting
differences in financial knowledge? We also evaluate which types of con-
sumers would benefit most from investment in financial knowledge and
the use of sophisticated investment products. These issues have not been
explored previously in a rich theoretical setting including uncertainty,
and our answers shed light on the important issue of wealth disparity over
the life cycle.
We build and calibrate a stochastic life cycle model featuring uncer-
tainty in income, capital market returns, and medical expenditures. We
also incorporate an endogenous knowledge accumulation process and
a sophisticated saving technology. In themodel, financial knowledge per-
mits consumers to use sophisticated financial products that can help them
raise the return earned on saving. Individuals who wish to transfer re-
sources over time by saving will benefit most from financial knowledge.
Moreover, because of how the US social insurance system works (along
with many other such systems around the world), better-educated indi-
viduals have the most to gain from investing in financial knowledge. As
a result, making financial knowledge accumulation endogenous allows
for an amplification of differences in accumulated retirement wealth over
the life cycle.
We make several contributions to the literature. First and foremost,
our model endogenously generates wealth inequality above and beyond
what traditional models of saving normally deliver. That is, a simple life
cycle model of saving fails to replicate observed levels of wealth inequal-
ity, and little additional ground is gained by adding realism in the form
of means-tested programs (e.g., Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995),
differences in preferences (e.g., Cagetti 2003), or heterogeneity in fixed
costs of investing (e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen 2003). Adding portfolio choice
by fully informed, rational agents under background income and lon-
gevity risk does generate variation in portfolio composition (Wachter
and Yogo 2010), but this still does not match wealth inequality on the or-
der of what we see in the real world. Also, Venti and Wise (2001) show
that permanent income differences and chance alone can explain only
30–40 percent of observed differences in retirement wealth, implying
that other factors should be taken into account. By introducing endog-
enous variation in the returns that people can obtain on their savings,
particularly on information-intensive assets, we can attribute another
30–40 percent of wealth inequality to financial knowledge.
Second, we explain why many consumers lack knowledge about key as-
pects of financial markets, consistent with extensive research reporting
that a large proportion of the population is not financially literate (Lu-
sardi and Mitchell 2014). Third, we show that some level of financial ig-
norance may, in fact, be optimal. That is, we explain why consumers may
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rationally fail to invest in knowledge, since it is expensive to acquire and
not everyone will benefit from greater financial sophistication. Finally, al-
though consumers optimally choose financial knowledge given their con-
straints, imperfect financial knowledge still implies a meaningful welfare
loss. That is, consumers would be willing to pay up to 3 percent of per-
period consumption over their lifetimes in order to live in a worldwith per-
fect financial knowledge. Moreover, we find that a reform curtailing Social
Security benefits would be anticipated to lead to higher financial knowl-
edge.
The paper is organized as follows: we first briefly summarize prior
studies, and then we offer evidence on the life cycle paths of assets, con-
sumers’ use of financial products, and financial knowledge accumulation.
Next we present our model, outline the model calibration, and report sim-
ulation results along with several extensions and robustness analyses. The
paper closes with conclusions and implications.
II. Prior Literature
Ourworkbuilds on several related literatures including researchonhouse-
hold life cycle saving patterns (see, e.g., Hubbard et al. 1995; Gourinchas
and Parker 2002; Cagetti 2003; Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun 2006;
De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010). We depart from conventional inter-
temporal models in that we allow for the endogenous choice of a saving
technology with returns and costs that depend on a consumer’s level of
financial knowledge. In this way, we extend the portfolio choice litera-
ture (e.g., Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005) in which returns are as-
sumed to be exogenous and consumers decide only how much they will
invest in risky assets. Our work is also informed by prior studies that ex-
amine patterns of financial knowledge in the general population. For in-
stance, Bernheim (1998) was among the first to note that many US con-
sumers display low levels of financial literacy. Mandell (2008) reported
widespread knowledge gaps regarding fundamental economic concepts
among high school students. Lusardi and Mitchell’s (2011a) Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) modules on planning and financial literacy
showed that many older individuals (age 501) could not do simple com-
putations, nor did they grasp basic inflation and risk diversification con-
cepts. Similar patterns also characterize younger adults (Lusardi and
Mitchell 2014), and there is considerable heterogeneity in the popula-
tion. Understanding the determinants of this heterogeneity is of para-
mount importance.2
2 Low levels of financial skills are not a problem only in the United States, as indicated by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005). Lusardi and
Mitchell (2011b, 2014) review a range of studies documenting low financial literacy levels
around the world.
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Some previous researchers have also suggested that financial knowl-
edge is an endogenously determined choice variable. For example, Dela-
vande, Rohwedder, and Willis (2008) posited that investment in finan-
cial knowledge is akin to human capital investment, but their static
model could not trace life cycle wealth patterns. Jappelli and Padula
(2013) discussed investments in financial knowledge, but their model
did not explore implications for wealth inequality. Both papers built
on the seminal work of Ben-Porath (1967) and Becker (1975), who mod-
eled the economic decision to invest in human capital by linking educa-
tion to wages. As with other human capital models, we assume that con-
sumers have a basic level of sophistication regarding numeracy (e.g.,
knowledge of compound interest), so they can assess the returns from
investing in knowledge. On a continuum from basic to sophisticated, fi-
nancial knowledge incorporates the acquisition of particular skills as well
as having information and awareness of financial products. Hence, in
our framework, financial knowledge is not an innate trait; instead, it is
acquired by investment throughout the life cycle. Our contribution is
to model financial knowledge investment using a rich intertemporal set-
ting with decision making under many realistic sources of uncertainty;
this approach permits us to evaluate the quantitative importance of fi-
nancial knowledge and to perform informative policy experiments.
Our work also helps us understand recent empirical findings regard-
ing financial knowledge and economically consequential outcomes. For
example, our analysis is consistent with evidence of a positive empirical
link between financial knowledge and wealth holdings (see, e.g., Lusardi
and Mitchell 2011a; van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2012). Additionally,
our model helps explain why highly knowledgeable consumers may be
more likely to participate in the stock market, which is represented be-
low by the use of a sophisticated investment technology.3
Finally, our analysis speaks to the difficulty that standard life cyclemod-
els have when attempting to account for observed wealth inequality us-
ing only heterogeneity in education and permanent income. In view of
the conventional model’s shortcomings, some researchers have invoked
a variety of factors including impatience in the form of hyperbolic dis-
counting (Angeletos et al. 2001) or means-tested programs (Hubbard
et al. 1995). By contrast, our approach draws on the fact that risk-adjusted
expected returns from financial products can differ across income
groups. For example, Yitzhaki (1987) established that higher earners en-
joyed higher returns on stock market holdings. In experimental settings,
Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2010) and Hastings, Mitchell, and Chyn
3 This is supported by the empirical evidence in Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2010)
and van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011), among others.
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(2011) showed that more financially knowledgeable individuals paid lower
fees for mutual funds. Since such fees can substantially reduce net returns
on such investments, this implies that financial knowledge boosts inves-
tors’ net returns. Using administrative data from a large financial institu-
tion combined with a survey, Clark, Lusardi, and Mitchell (2015) found
that more financially knowledgeable employees could expect to earn
higher risk-adjusted returns on their retirement savings.
One might think that financial knowledge would not be needed if in-
dividuals could rely on financial advisers; yet in practice, only a minority
of the population does so. For instance, Bricker et al. (2012) reported
that fewer than one-third of respondents in the US Survey of Consumer
Finances consulted advisers, and we found similar results in the US Na-
tional Financial Capability Study (NFCS). Importantly, there are also
large differences across education groups: only 11 percent of high school
dropouts use professional advice, versus 45 percent of college gradu-
ates.4 Thus the least educated, who also have the least financial knowl-
edge, are rather unlikely to turn to financial professionals for advice.
It is also worth noting that there are impediments to obtaining good fi-
nancial advice when consumers lack financial knowledge (US General
Accounting Office 2011). In other words, financial knowledge is plausi-
bly a complement to, rather than a substitute for, financial advice (Col-
lins 2012).
Financial knowledge could also have an effect on diversification, which
may lead to higher risk-adjusted returns. As one example, Calvet, Camp-
bell, and Sodini (2009) showed that better-educated Swedish households
held more stock than the less educated, and conditional on holding
stocks, they achieved lower nonsystematic risk on their portfolios. As an-
other example, using Dutch data, von Gaudecker (2015) looked at the
relationship between investment diversification (return loss), financial
knowledge, and financial advice, and he reported that the least financially
literate were unlikely to diversify their assets.
Large differences in returns can produce a considerable amount of
wealth inequality: for example, a dollar invested at a 6 percent versus a
2 percent return over 50 years grows to be about seven times larger.
Moreover, to simply assume substantial heterogeneity in returns across
population groups does not help much in explaining wealth differen-
tials, since that merely replaces one source of unexplained heterogene-
ity with another. Instead, our approach generates such heterogeneity
arising from endogenous accumulation of financial knowledge.
4 Only 30 percent of white men responding to the NFCS reported that they sought ad-
vice over the past 5 years from financial professionals regarding saving and investment. Ad-
ditional detail is available from the authors on request.
436 journal of political economy
This content downloaded from 130.091.050.029 on September 08, 2017 09:24:30 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
III. Life Cycle Wealth and Financial Knowledge
A. The Evolution of Income and Assets by Education
The basic life cycle economic model posits that consumers seek to trans-
fer resources from periods of their lives when they earn substantial in-
come to periods when they earn less, given concavity of the utility func-
tion. We illustrate typical household income profiles over the life cycle in
figure 1, which plots median net (after-tax) household income by edu-
cation group constructed from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID).5 Educational attainment refers to three sets of household heads:
those who did not complete high school (<HS), high school graduates
(HS), and those with at least some college (college1). We focus on white
males throughout this paper to keep our sample as homogeneous as pos-
sible.
As is evident, life cycle household income for this cohort is hump
shaped. It rises at a faster rate for the college-educated than for the less
educated, and from around age 50 onward, income slowly decreases for
all groups. After retirement, income falls because Social Security and
pension benefit amounts are generally less than labor earnings. In the
United States, old-age benefit replacement rates are higher for the least
educated because of the progressivity of public safety net programs, so
better-educated consumers see their incomes fall relatively more after re-
tirement. Net household income also declines somewhat for all groups in
retirement, in part because of changes in household composition (e.g.,
loss of a spouse).
Figure 2 traces life cycle paths of median net wealth (defined as the
sum of bank accounts, stocks, individual retirement accounts, mutual
funds, bonds, and net real estate, minus debt) for these same individu-
als.6 We drop from these calculations individuals with business assets
and exclude outliers.7 For the typical household, wealth grows steadily
up to the mid-60s and then flattens or declines. Again, there are striking
differences by educational attainment, with the median college-educated
household having around $375,000 in wealth at age 65 (in 2004 dollars).
5 These calculations use the PSID Cross-National Equivalent Files from 1984 to 2005 (in
2004 dollars), where after-tax household income excludes income from capital. To gener-
ate the figure, we first run median regressions with age and cohort effects, and then we
predict incomes for the 1935–45 cohorts. Age dummies are smoothed with a lowess filter.
6 In what follows, we refer interchangeably to net wealth, net assets, net worth, and
household wealth. As the PSID does not have data on 401(k) plan balances, these are
not included in wealth measures prior to retirement; nevertheless, income received from
401(k) plans is included in our incomemeasure. Furthermore, if the balance from a 401(k)
plan is cashed out at retirement and rolled over to some other form of asset, it is included in
our wealth measure.
7 Including those with business assets skews the interpretation of saving motives com-
pared to the general population because of the large amount of wealth held in these ven-
tures as well as the volatility of business owners’ incomes (see Hurst et al. 2010).
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By contrast, high school dropouts at the same age had accumulated only
$125,000, with most of that in the form of housing wealth.
In the simplest version of the life cycle savingmodel, individuals will op-
timally consume only a portion of their lifetime incomes each period,
borrowing in some periods and saving in others. A key prediction of this
framework is that the life cycle path of assets normalized by lifetime
income should be the same across groups. Therefore, as noted by Hub-
bard et al. (1995), higher earners would be predicted to have wealth pro-
files that simply scale up lower earners’ paths. Yet the data reveal non-
proportional wealth-to-income profiles, implying that the simple life
cyclemodel cannot explain observed wealth heterogeneity. This is consis-
tent with evidence of large differences in saving rates across education
groups in the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the PSID (Dynan, Skin-
ner, and Zeldes 2004).
More sophisticated models allow for a precautionary saving motive,
which comes into play when income is uncertain, insurance markets
FIG. 1.—Life cycle net household income profiles by educational attainment. This fig-
ure shows median net household income by education group computed from the PSID
for waves 1984–2005 (in 2004 dollars; see the text). The term <HS refers to households
in which the head has less than a high school diploma, HS indicates that the head completed
high school, and college1 means that the head had at least some college. The figure ad-
justs for cohort effects based on median regressions with age controls; predictions are for
those born in 1935–45. The income measure excludes capital income, and observations
with income in excess of $250,000 are also excluded. Age profiles are smoothed using a
lowess filter.
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are imperfect, and borrowing is difficult. In these circumstances, some
individuals anticipate that they will have a very high marginal utility of
consumption when future income is low. Given a concave utility function
exhibiting prudence, such a consumer would save more in anticipation
of this possibility (see Deaton 1992). While precautionary saving can ex-
plain some of the heterogeneity observed in the data, it still falls short of
explaining wealth differences among those facing similar uncertain in-
come profiles. Yet another explanation for why the less educated fail
to save was offered by Hubbard et al. (1995), who noted that the US so-
cial insurance system protects families with limited resources against bad
states of the world. That is, means-tested and redistributive transfer pro-
grams such as Social Security, Medicaid, and Supplemental Security In-
come provide an explicit consumption floor in the event that house-
holds fall into poverty. In turn, the existence of such a consumption
floor dampens consumers’ precautionary savingmotives, particularly when
people are rather likely to become eligible for such benefits. Though this
does help explain why the less educated save little, it cannot explain wealth
inequality in the upper half of the income distribution where the con-
sumption floor is less likely to be binding.
FIG. 2.—Life cycle wealth by educational attainment. This figure reports median wealth
profiles by education group from the PSID (in 2004 dollars; see fig. 1 and the text). The
profiles are predicted frommedian regressions with a correction for cohort effects (follow-
ing French [2005]); wealth refers to the sum of assets minus debt. Wealth is predicted for
all persons born in 1935–45; age profiles are smoothed using a lowess filter.
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Other authors appeal to differences in preferences to explain observed
wealth inequality patterns. For example, Cagetti (2003) found that less
educated consumers have a high rate of time preference and lower rate
of risk aversion, compared to more educated consumers. When using
constant relative risk aversion preferences, lower risk aversion implies
lower prudence. This leads to small precautionary saving for the less ed-
ucated and younger consumers, while college-educated consumers were
more patient and more prudent. Differences in household composition
over the life cycle can also affect consumption by directly changing dis-
count factors or the marginal utility of consumption: inasmuch as house-
hold size is negatively correlated with education, this could also account
for some portion of wealth inequality (Attanasio et al. 1999; Scholz et al.
2006). Another potential channel generating wealth inequality might be
differences in anticipatedmortality patterns. It is well known that themore
educated live longer, whichmight also account for a portion of the observed
divergence in wealth accumulation (and decumulation) across groups (De
Nardi et al. 2010). Our analysis below incorporates many of these factors
to assesshow their impacts compare to thoseof endogenousfinancial knowl-
edge as a separate channel accounting for wealth inequality.
B. Differences in Sophisticated Financial Products
and Returns by Education
In view of the income paths illustrated above, it should be apparent that
college-educated consumers would optimally do relatively more saving,
compared to the less educated. In turn, this could make the better-
educated group more interested in a technology that enhanced returns
on resources transferred across periods, compared to their less educated
peers. Table 1 shows the fraction of PSID respondents holding stocks,
mutual funds, bonds, and/or IRAs, by age and education. We denote these
products as relatively “sophisticated,” compared to having only a bank ac-
count (or no savings at all).
Compared to high school dropouts (<HS), better-educated house-
holds are far more likely to use such sophisticated products for saving
(see also Curcuru et al. 2005; Campbell 2006). In particular, more than
three-quarters of the older (ages 55–65) college1 group use sophisticated
products, compared to about one-quarter of the high school dropouts of
the same age. We also note that the better educated hold a larger share
of their financial wealth in sophisticated products at all ages, conditional
on using them: for those 55–65, these account for almost 60 percent of
the assets of the college1 but only 50 percent for the least educated.
Importantly, differences across education groups at the intensive margin
(how much to invest in the products) are much smaller than differences
at the extensive margin (using the same products). Provided that sophis-
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ticated products yield higher returns, these differences in the composition
of savings could generate substantial differences in wealth levels at re-
tirement.
The possibility that the more educated and better paid enjoy higher
risk-adjusted returns may result from greater knowledge about financial
products. For instance, some authors surmise that lack of financial knowl-
edge can explain people’s low participation in the stock market (van Rooij
et al. 2011). Empirical information on the evolution of financial knowl-
edge over the life cycle may be gleaned from the NFCS.8 The NFCS con-
tains five questions measuring knowledge about compound interest, in-
flation, risk diversification, basic asset pricing, and mortgage interest
payments; some of these questions have been used to measure levels of
financial knowledge not only in the United States but also around the
world (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011b, 2014). The left-hand panel of figure 3
reports the fraction of correct answers by education and age in this sur-
vey, and four aspects are worth highlighting. First, financial knowledge
differs considerably across education groups. More than 40 percent of
the middle-aged college1 respondents answer all five questions correctly,
8 Here we refer to the 2012 survey; see http://www.usfinancialcapability.org.
TABLE 1
Life Cycle Participation and Share of Portfolio in
Sophisticated Financial Products (Stocks and IRAs)
by Educational Attainment in the PSID: 2001–5
By Age < High School High School College1 Total
Participation Rate
25–35 .158 .177 .541 .369
35–45 .173 .331 .623 .477
45–55 .193 .415 .651 .54
55–65 .28 .522 .752 .635
65–75 .421 .586 .732 .622
Total .243 .39 .652 .52
Share Financial Wealth
25–35 .391 .318 .442 .416
35–45 .393 .435 .516 .493
45–55 .478 .486 .559 .539
55–65 .5 .508 .564 .547
65–75 .584 .484 .611 .561
Total .502 .468 .543 .522
Note.—This table reports participation percentages and
the share of financial wealth invested in sophisticated finan-
cial products from PSID data (see text). Less than high school
refers to households in which the head has less than a high
school diploma, high school indicates that the head completed
high school, and college1 means that the head had at least
some college.
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but only 10 percent of high school dropouts do. Second, financial knowl-
edge increases over the life cycle, consistent with the idea that consumers
accumulate knowledge as they age. Third, observed differences in finan-
cial knowledge widen with age: the better educated tend to accumulate
more financial knowledge just prior to retirement. A regression of finan-
cial knowledge on age, education, and age/education interactions re-
veals that the interactions are statistically significant (the partial F-test sta-
tistic for the interactions is 5.6 with a p -value < .001), providing evidence
that differences across education groups grow differentially with age.
Fourth, there is some evidence that financial knowledge eventually de-
creases past middle age (consistent with Lusardi and Mitchell [2011a]).
The right-hand panel of figure 3 displays the percentage of respondents
by educational group who say they use financial advisers. In a regression
framework, we confirm that few people use advisers, particularly among
the least educated. This indicates that advice is probably a complement
to, rather than a substitute for, financial knowledge acquisition.
Equity investments provide higher expected returns than do bonds,
so one might anticipate that better-educated households would earn
higher returns than their lower-educated counterparts. Yet such differ-
FIG. 3.—Observed financial knowledge and use of financial advice by age and education.
The left panel shows the fraction of respondents in the 2012 National Financial Capability
Study (NFCS) who answered all five financial knowledge questions correctly, by 5-year age
groups and three education levels. The right panel shows the fraction of respondents in the
NFCS, by education level, who reported using a financial adviser. See also figure 1.
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ences in financial holdings are insufficient to generate observed wealth
inequality patterns; for instance, Venti and Wise (2001) reported that
including controls for stock ownership contributed little to explaining
the dispersion of wealth across households. That is, adding “investment
choices” as controls (in addition to lifetime earnings) reduces the un-
conditional standard deviation of wealth at retirement by only 8 percent,
at the margin. Accordingly, if the differential take-up of sophisticated
products is to account for a larger share of wealth inequality, researchers
must allow for the possibility that returns are persistently heterogeneous
across households in a predictable way. In fact, there is evidence that fi-
nancial knowledge is positively associated with investment returns. Lab
experiments by Choi et al. (2010) found that people who deemed them-
selves more financially knowledgeable did elect lower-fee investment op-
tions than their counterparts, a finding confirmed in other studies ex-
amining fees and retirement saving (Hastings et al. 2011). Jappelli and
Padula (2013) cited additional evidence on the relationship between
interest rates and proxies for financial literacy. Most importantly, they
showed that those who correctly answered more financial literacy ques-
tions got higher returns on their savings, evidence corroborated by self-
reported information on what interest rates people thought they could
earn. Using administrative data from a large financial institution, Clark
et al. (2015) found that more financially knowledgeable employees
earned higher expected risk-adjusted returns on their 401(k) accounts
compared to those with little financial knowledge.
C. Financial Knowledge and Wealth Accumulation
To illustrate how financial knowledge can alter the invariance of wealth
to income in a standard life cycle model, we first offer a two-period ex-
ample. Subsequently, we extend themodel to incorporate a richer frame-
work. Accordingly, we assume that the consumer receives labor income y
only in the first period. Denoting wealth in period 2 as a, we seek to un-
derstand wealth accumulation in period 2 as a function of lifetime in-
come. The consumer can choose howmuch to consume, c, in the first pe-
riod and how much to invest in raising R, the return factor on saving, s.
For simplicity, we assume that there is a one-to-one mapping between
knowledge and R. Thus, a 5 Rs and c 5 y 2 pR 2 a=R , where p is the
monetary cost of raising R by one unit. Assuming the consumer has a
discount factor b, he maximizes
max
a,R
 u y 2 pR 2 a=Rð Þ 1 bu að Þ:
Assuming log utility, uðcÞ 5 log  c, and fixed R and thus no investment
in knowledge, the solution for wealth is proportional to income, and
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therefore normalized optimal wealth is a constant (a*=y 5 Rb=ð1 1 bÞ).
But when we maximize jointly over a and R , we obtain the following so-
lution for optimal wealth as a ratio of income:
a*
y
5
y
½2 1 ð1=bÞ2p :
Optimal wealth as a ratio of income increases with income, a finding that
breaks the invariance property.9 In a model with endogenous knowl-
edge, there is a complementarity between an agent’s need to save and
his willingness to invest to raise R . For high values of y, the reward to in-
vesting in R rises because saving needs are relatively important. In this
two-period model, where lifetime income and the income trajectory are
the same, it is not higher income per se that raises the incentive to invest
in financial knowledge, but rather the need to smooth marginal utility
between periods. The need is greater when there is a larger gap between
first- and second-period consumption. Accordingly, heterogeneity in re-
tiree benefit replacement rates can affect the incentives to invest in finan-
cial knowledge; in turn, this can lead to additional differences in wealth
accumulation. The same can be said of differences in demographic fac-
tors (e.g., family size) that shift the marginal utility of consumption over
the life cycle, as well as differences in expected mortality. As indicated
above, the slope depends in part on the discount factor and the cost of
investing in knowledge. The relationship is stronger for lower values of
the cost of investing in knowledge and for higher b.
A richer setting with uncertainty and borrowing constraints offers ad-
ditional motivations to save. If consumers are liquidity constrained, they
may be unwilling to invest in financial knowledge. Faced with uncertainty,
the consumer might also wish to save more and invest more in financial
knowledge for precautionary reasons. Furthermore, the sensitivity of sav-
ing to the interest rate can be smaller than in the certainty case (Cagetti
2003), which may also affect incentives to invest in knowledge. Accord-
ingly, we next turn to a richer model of saving to investigate the effects
of financial knowledge on wealth and wealth inequality.
9 Assuming power utility, the first-order condition (uðcÞ 5 c12j=ð1 2 jÞ) for wealth is
a12ð1=2jÞðy 2 2 ffiffiffiffiffiffipap Þ 5
ffiffiffi
p
p
b
 1=j
:
While the right-hand side of the equation is constant with wealth, the left-hand side is not:
the left-hand side is decreasing in a for reasonable values of j and p. A rise in income in-
creases the left-hand side for a given wealth level. If the wealth ratio is to increase to equal
the right-hand side, wealth must rise by more than income.
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IV. The Model
We extend the two-period example above in several directions to allow
cross-sectional variation in both financial knowledge and wealth levels.
First, we introduce uncertainty regarding asset returns, household in-
come, and out-of-pocket medical expenditures. The consumer is assumed
to choose his consumption stream by maximizing expected discounted
utility, where utility flows are discounted by b. Second, the individual also
faces stochastic mortality risk, and decisions are made from time t 5 0
(age 25) to age T (or as long as the consumer is still alive; T5 100). Third,
and adding to the heterogeneity created by the stochastic components, we
also examine three different education groups (<HS, HS, and college1).
Across these groups, we allow for heterogeneity in income, mortality, de-
mographics, and out-of-pocket medical expenditure levels. Importantly,
to highlight how investment in financial knowledge affects outcomes, we
do not allow for differences in preferences, and we assume that consum-
ers start their life cycles with no financial knowledge. In extensions pre-
sented below, we consider the role of alternative preferences, including
allowing for taste heterogeneity.
The utility function is assumed to be strictly concave in consumption
and defined as ntuðct=ntÞ, where nt is an equivalence scale capturing
(known) differences in consumption patterns across demographic groups
(Scholz et al. 2006). The marginal utility of consumption is u0ðct=ntÞ and
thus rises with nt. Since the path of nt is hump-shaped over the life cycle,
this contributes to generate a hump-shaped consumption profile with
age (Attanasio et al. 1999).
The consumer may elect to invest his resources in two different invest-
ment technologies. The first is a basic technology (e.g., a checking ac-
count) that yields a certain (low) return r (R 5 1 1 r). This represents
the expected return to consumers without any financial know-how. The
second is a more sophisticated technology that enables the consumer to
receive a higher expected return, which increases in financial knowledge
f but comes at a cost. Specifically, the consumer must pay a direct cost
(fee) to use the technology, cd, and he must also invest time and money
in acquiring the knowledge to generate a sufficiently high excess return.
Obtaining knowledge in the form of investment it thus has a cost of pi
(it); we assume that this cost function is convex, reflecting decreasing re-
turns in the production of knowledge.10 Relatively little is known about
how this cost might vary across individuals; for instance, it could either
rise or fall depending on the level of education. Clearly the opportunity
cost of time is higher for higher earners, but education might be a com-
10 A convex cost function has the advantage of avoiding bang-bang solutions where con-
sumers invest massively in one period; hence it encourages the smoothing of investment
over time (see Delavande et al. 2008).
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plement in the production of knowledge, making it easier for the better
educated to learn. We remain agnostic about whether the average cost of
investing in additional knowledge is higher or lower for more educated
households; rather, we assume initially that all households face the same
cost function.
The rate of return on the sophisticated technology is stochastic, with
an expected return that depends on the agent’s level of financial knowl-
edge at the end of t, ~Rð ft11Þ. Thus the stochastic return function is log-
normally distributed with log ~Rð ft11Þ 5 r 1 r ð ft Þ 1 jεεt , where jε is the
standard deviation of a normally distributed shock εt. The function r( ft)
is increasing in ft, and it can be interpreted as an excess return function.
Since the variance is assumed fixed, this also implies that agents with
higher financial knowledge obtain a higher Sharpe ratio (higher risk-
adjusted return) on their investments.11 We denote by kt the fraction
of wealth that the consumer invests in the sophisticated technology in
period t.
We posit that financial knowledge evolves according to the following
equation:
ft11 5 1 2 dð Þft 1 it ,
where d is a depreciation rate and it is gross investment. Depreciation ex-
ists both because consumer financial knowledge may decay and because
some knowledge may become obsolete as new financial products are
developed.12
The consumer is also eligible for a government transfer trt that guaran-
tees a minimum consumption floor of cmin (as in Hubbard et al. [1995]).
This consumption floor may lower the expected variance of future con-
sumption, which diminishes the precautionary motive for saving. Trans-
fers are defined as tr t 5 maxðcmin 2 xt , 0Þ, where cash on hand is
xt 5 at 1 yt 2 oopt ,
where yt is net household income and oopt represents out-of-pocket
medical expenditures. Both variables are stochastic over and above a de-
terministic trend. The sophisticated technology cannot be purchased if
xt 2 cd < cmin (i.e., the government will not pay for costs of obtaining the
technology). End-of-period assets are given by
at11 5 ~Rk ft11ð Þ½xt 1 tr t 2ct 2 p itð Þ 2 cdI kt > 0ð Þ,
11 Below we also consider the possibility that financial knowledge allows a reduction in
risk through diversification.
12 An extension below also examines learning by doing as an alternative form of invest-
ment in knowledge.
446 journal of political economy
This content downloaded from 130.091.050.029 on September 08, 2017 09:24:30 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
where ~Rkð ft11Þ 5 ð1 2 ktÞR 1 kt ~Rð ft Þ. We impose a borrowing constraint
on the model such that assets at11 must be nonnegative.
As in many papers in this literature, we posit that during the work life,
the individual’s net income equation (in logs) is given by a deterministic
component that depends on education, age, and an AR(1) stochastic
process:
log  ye,t 5 gy,e tð Þ 1 my,t 1 ny,t ,
my,t 5 ry,emy,t21 1 εy,t ,
εy,t ∼ N

0, j2y,ε

,  ny,t ∼ N

0, j2y,v

:
Here e represents the education group, and gy,e(t) is an age polynomial
(quadratic). The error term hy,t is the sum of a persistent component my,t
and an idiosyncratic component ny,t. Retirement is exogenous at age 65.
After retirement, the individual receives retirement benefits that are a
function of preretirement income.
A similar stochastic AR(1) process is assumed for out-of-pocket medi-
cal expenditures. Out-of-pocket expenditures (in logs) follow the pro-
cess described below:
log  oope,t 5 go,e tð Þ 1 mo,t 1 no,t ,
mo,t 5 ro,emo,t21 1 εo,t ,
εo,t ∼ N

0, j2o,ε

,  no,t ∼ N

0, j2o,v

:
Because these expenditures are generally low prior to retirement (and
to save on computation time), we allow only for medical expenditure risk
after retirement (as in Hubbard et al. [1995]). Again, the error term ho,t is
the sum of a persistent component mo,t and an idiosyncratic component no,t.
Finally, we allow for mortality risk at all ages, denoting pe,t as the 1-year
survival probability. Mortality risk is allowed to differ across education
groups.
The state space in period t is defined as st 5 ðhy,t , ho,t , e, ft , atÞ. The con-
sumer’s decisions are given by (ct, it, kt). Hence there are three continu-
ous control variables (consumption, investment, and the share of invest-
ment in the technology). There are five state variables. We represent the
problem as a series of Bellman equations such that, at each age, the value
function has the following form:13
13 This formulation abstracts from bequest motives. While an extension to include be-
quests could be interesting, the evidence suggests that this would have a minimal effect
on wealth decumulation among the elderly (De Nardi et al. 2010). Moreover, incorporat-
ing bequests would increase wealth inequality without changing the qualitative nature of
our results.
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Vd stð Þ 5 max
ct ,it ,kt
ne,tuðct=ne,tÞ
1 bpe,t
ð
ε
ð
hy
ð
ho
V st11ð ÞdFe hoð ÞdFeðhyÞdF εð Þ,
at11 5 ~Rk ft11ð Þ½at 1 ye ,t 1 oope,t 1 tr t 2 ct 2 p itð Þ 2 cdI kt > 0ð Þ,
ft11 5 1 2 dð Þft 1 it ,
~Rk ft11ð Þ 5 1 2 ktð ÞR 1 kt ~R ftð Þ,
where at11 ≥ 0. We index variables by e where education differences are
assumed to be present.14
The model is solved by backward recursion after discretizing the
continuous-state variables. At each point in the state space, we use a sim-
plex method (Nelder-Mead) to search for the optimal solution of con-
sumption, financial knowledge investment, and investment in the sophis-
ticated technology. We also evaluate utility at corner solutions because of
kinks in the objective function. We solve for optimal decisions for a grid
of 40 net asset points and 25 financial knowledge points. Bilinear interpo-
lation is used to find the value function when net assets or the financial
knowledge stock at t 1 1 falls off the grid; the value function behaves
smoothly and is concave except at low levels of net assets where liquidity
constraints and the consumption floor bind. Accordingly, the grid for as-
sets in the state space is defined as equally spaced points on a0.3, which
leads to more points at lower levels of net assets. We use the method pro-
posed by Tauchen (1986) to discretize the processes for income and out-
of-pocket median expenditures (with seven points each). Finally, we use
seven points for rate of return shocks. The resulting decision rules are
smooth and well behaved.
V. Calibration
Our goals are to show how endogenous financial knowledge affects wealth
holding and to understand the determinants of financial knowledge ac-
cumulation patterns. Since we lack information on returns by education
group over the life cycle, we do not estimate all relevant parameters of
the model. Rather, we proceed with a calibration using plausible values
from the literature for preferences and constraints for our base case. Ad-
ditionally, we provide results from extensive sensitivity analyses in Sec-
tion VI.
14 There are four sources of risk over which the value function is integrated: mortality,
rate of return, out-of-pocket medical expenditures, and income. These risks are assumed
to be independent.
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To implement the model in the base case, we assume that uðct=ntÞ has
a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form with relative risk aversion
j. The value of 3 for this parameter used by Hubbard et al. (1995) is rea-
sonable in their context, since their main mechanism for creating dis-
persion in saving patterns is the differential impact of the precautionary
saving motive due to a consumption floor. Accordingly, their precaution-
ary saving motive governed by the coefficient of relative prudence, 11 j,
needed to be large. By contrast, our model has an additional channel for
creating wealth dispersion, so there is no need for such a strong precau-
tionary saving motive. We use a value of j5 1.6 in the base case, which is
close to the value estimated by Attanasio et al. (1999) using consumption
data. It is worth noting that the portfolio choice literature typically as-
sumes risk aversion parameters in excess of 4 (e.g., Campbell and Viceira
2002; Cocco et al. 2005), but we do not require such a high degree of risk
aversion in our model. One reason is that agents with low financial
knowledge already face low returns if they use the sophisticated technol-
ogy; hence they will not adopt it. Additionally, the cost of participating in
the sophisticated technology reduces the incentives to use it (Vissing-
Jorgensen 2003). Both factors imply that we can fit market participation
patterns relatively well using the sophisticated technology proposed here,
without resorting to high values of risk aversion.
Following Scholz et al. (2006), we define an equivalence scale that ac-
counts for consumption differences in household size by education group
and changes in family composition over the life cycle. Let zð j , kÞ 5 ð j 1
0:7kÞ0:75, where j is the number of adults in the household and k is
the number of children (under 18 years old). We then define ne,t 5
zð je,t , ke,tÞ=zð2, 1Þ, where je,t and ke,t are the average number of adults
and children in the household by age and education group, and z(2, 1)
is the equivalence scale for a household with two adults and one child.
We use PSID data to estimate the time series of average equivalence scales
by education group. The age profile of those scales is hump-shaped and
more amplified for less educated households.15 For the base case, we use
a discount factor of 0.96 (as in Campbell and Viceira [2002] and Scholz
et al. [2006]).16 The annual minimum consumption floor is set at $10,000
per couple with one child.17
15 In the PSID, we compute the average number of adults and children (under 18 years
old) per household, according to the head’s education and age. We then implement the
equivalence scale according to the formula in the text.
16 This is also close to the value of De Nardi et al. (2010), who estimate it to be 0.97, and
Cagetti (2003), who estimates a value of 0.948 for high school dropouts and 0.989 for the
college educated.
17 This value is derived from the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (2008),
where the maximum monthly benefit payable to a couple with one child under the Tem-
porary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program was $495 (in 2006 dollars). The av-
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Postretirement income is a function of preretirement income, esti-
mated from fixed-effect regressions analyzed separately by education level
of net household income on age and a retirement dummy. This produces
replacement rates of 0.75 for high school dropouts, 0.74 for high school
graduates, and 0.63 for the college1, close to those based on total retire-
ment income in the literature (e.g., AonConsulting 2008). These are higher
than rates based only on Social Security benefits, since older households
have additional sources of retirement income (e.g., spousal earnings, em-
ployer pension benefits, annuities, etc.). Following retirement, we let in-
come decline at the rate estimated in PSID data controlling for educa-
tional groups and cohort effects; that pattern is mostly due to changes in
household composition (e.g., widowhood).
The return on the safe asset is set to r 5 2 percent (as in Campbell
and Viceira [2002]). The form of the excess return function is unavailable
from previous studies. The range of risk-adjusted excess portfolio returns
reported, for example, by von Gaudecker (2015) is 20.017 (5th percen-
tile) to 0.054 (95th percentile).18 Using Euler equations, Jappelli and
Padula (2013) estimated that each point of financial literacy is associated
with an expected increase in the return on saving from 0.2 to 1 percent.
For simplicity, we employ a linear function by setting rmax 5 r ð fmaxÞ 5
0:04 and rmin 5 rð fminÞ 5 0, where 0.04 is chosen to match the equity
premium used in the portfolio literature. Below, we choose a convex cost
function for investing in financial knowledge, which therefore embodies
decreasing returns to producing knowledge. Accordingly, even if the
production function is linear, agents will seek to smooth their invest-
ments in financial knowledge over the life cycle. We adopt this simpler
form of the production function in order to show the basic mechanisms
of the model. In robustness analysis reported later, we show how allow-
ing for a concave relationship between financial knowledge and returns
affects results regarding the role of financial knowledge in explaining
wealth inequality. We set jε 5 0:16 in the simulations (Campbell and
Viceira 2002).
To compute the deterministic part of net household income, we draw
on PSID data from the Cross-National Equivalent files (https://cnef
18 We thank Hans-Martin von Gaudecker for sharing these statistics from the Dutch port-
folio data with us.
erage monthly benefit of recipients on food stamps (for a three-person household) was
$283. Hence, prior to age 65, the sum of TANF and food stamp benefits totaled $778/
month for a three-person household or $9,336/year (omitting the lifetime TANF receipt
limit). The Social Security Administration (http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheets
/colafacts2004.htm) reports that the 2004 maximummonthly federal payment for Supple-
mentary Security Income was $552 for a single household and $829 for couples; including
food stamps yields an annual total of $7,620 for singles and $12,180 for couples. Accord-
ingly we use a value of $10,000/year in 2004 dollars, comparable to the $12,000 used by
Hubbard et al. (1995).
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.ehe.osu.edu/), pooling all available waves (1980–2005). The NBER’s Tax-
sim program is used to compute net household income. We account for
cohort effects when computing income profiles, setting the cohort effect
for our calibration baseline to the 1935–45 birth group. For comparabil-
ity with prior studies, we use the AR(1) error structure estimated by Hub-
bard et al. (1995) for net household income prior to age 65. Earnings
are quite persistent: the autocorrelation coefficient is set to 0.95, con-
stant across education groups, while the variance of the innovation de-
creases with education (0.033 for high school dropouts to 0.016 for
the college1). We use HRS data to compute the profile of household
out-of-pocket medical expenditures allowing for cohort effects; we pre-
dict the profiles for those born between 1935 and 1945, again using
the error structure estimated by Hubbard et al. Expenditures also prove
to be quite persistent. The autocorrelation coefficient is therefore set to
0.901, constant across education groups. The variance of the innovation
ranges from 0.175 for dropouts to 0.153 for the college1. Following the
literature (Hubbard et al. 1995; Scholz et al. 2006), we set the variance
of the transitory error component to zero in the simulations since most
of it likely reflects measurement error.
Estimating the price of acquiring financial knowledge is difficult be-
cause little information is available on inputs to the production pro-
cess—time and expenditures on financial services—let alone data on in-
vestments in, as opposed to the stock of, financial knowledge. According
to Turner and Muir (2013), the cost of a 1-hour financial advice consul-
tation averages about $250. Veritat.com offers financial planning at $25
a month for singles and $40 for families ($35 for retirees), after an ini-
tial meeting fee of $250. Accordingly, the cost can range from $550 for
singles to $730 for families. Less expensive alternatives include financial
advice software such as ESPlanner, where a 1-year license costs $40 (the
upgraded ESPlanner costs $149; see http://esplanner.com/product
_catalog). Since the first units of knowledge are probably cheap to ac-
quire and marginal cost probably rises quickly, we use the function
pðitÞ 5 50i1:75t . For the participation cost of the sophisticated technology
(cd), we use the median estimate of $750 (in 2004 dollars) from Vissing-
Jorgensen (2003).
We also require an estimate of the depreciation factor for financial
knowledge, d, but there is little information on the size of this parameter.
One study reported that undergraduates’ economic knowledge depreci-
ated 4–10 percent annually (Kipps and Kohen 1984). Wage and labor
supply information has also been used to measure human capital depre-
ciation; for instance, Heckman (1976) estimated annual depreciation
rates of 3–7 percent. We use a value of 6 percent in our baseline calibra-
tion and study how results vary from that baseline in the robustness anal-
ysis. We could permit the depreciation rate to rise with age to reflect the
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possibility of cognitive decline. Indeed, this would be consistent with the
hump-shaped life cycle pattern of financial savvy reported in Agarwal et al.
(2009). Even with a fixed depreciation rate of financial knowledge, how-
ever, we show below that we can still produce a hump-shaped financial
knowledge profile over the life cycle.
We also allow for mortality risk differences across education groups,
estimated using Gompertz hazard regressions in HRS data for people
aged 501, allowing for proportional education effects.19 We assume the
same proportionality by education prior to age 50, but we use age/mor-
tality profiles taken from population life tables.
Upon finding optimal consumption, financial knowledge investment,
and technology participation at each point in the state space and at each
age, we then use our decision rules to simulate 5,000 individuals moving
through their life cycles. We draw income, out-of-pocket medical expen-
diture, and rate of return shocks, and we then simulate the life cycle
paths of all consumers. These consumers are given the initial conditions
for education, earnings, and assets derived from the PSID for individuals
aged 25–30. We initialize financial knowledge at the lowest level, which is
zero. This makes clear how endogenous accumulation of financial knowl-
edge affects wealth outcomes, and it abstracts from differences in initial
conditions. A list of the baseline parameters and their values appears in
Appendix table A1 (and detailed simulation results for all scenarios and
calibrations discussed below appear in the online appendix).
VI. Results
Our discussion of the simulation results focuses on outcomes around the
time of retirement, since this is when heterogeneity in net wealth is most
evident. Table 2 compares our simulation results by education group
with PSID data, where key outcomes include median wealth, average in-
come, wealth-to-income, and the fraction poor (defined as having wealth
less than twice income). It also reports the fraction participating in and
the share of wealth in the sophisticated technology. The ratio of median
wealth to income (average lifetime income for each group) is 2.98 for
dropouts and 7.3 for the college educated. In other words, our model
generates a strongly positive relationship between accumulated wealth
(normalized by income) and income. Moreover, our simulated wealth
patterns closely replicate those in the PSID. Specifically, at age 65, the
simulated median high school dropout has accumulated half as much
wealth as high school graduates ($94,746 vs. $177,391), while the college1
19 Life expectancy as of age 25 is 5 years higher for the college educated compared to
high school dropouts. Regression results are available on request.
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group held 3.66 times as much retirement wealth ($346,805) compared
to high school dropouts. Using the same average simulated lifetime in-
come measures in the PSID, we obtain a close-to-perfect match between
the simulations and the data in terms of normalized wealth (wealth-to-
income ratios). Our model generates a college1/<HS median wealth in-
equality ratio of 2.45, whereas in the PSID it is 2.41. We also simulate the
percentage of individuals who are poor in old age, proxied by the fraction
of consumers reaching retirement age with assets below twice their in-
comes. As indicated in table 2, almost 40 percent of high school dropouts
are poor according to this metric versus 17 percent for the college1
group. These results compare closely to the PSID age 65 fraction poor
by education, at 35 percent and 16 percent, respectively.
Table 2 further indicates the share of consumers who will invest in the
sophisticated technology over their lifetimes, a ratio that also varies by
education group. Among the dropouts, 45 percent do so, versus 61 per-
cent of the high school graduates and 78 percent of the college1 group.
The PSID pattern is remarkably close to these outcomes, at 28, 63, and
75 percent, respectively. Generating large differences in participation
across education groups is notoriously difficult in models that assume
TABLE 2
Simulated and Observed Outcomes at Retirement (Age 65)
< High School High School College1
Ratio (College1/
< High School)
Simulation
Median wealth 94,746 177,391 346,805 3.66
Average income 31,780 38,703 47,485 1.494
Wealth-to-income ratio 2.981 4.583 7.303 2.45
Fraction poor (at > 2yt) .387 .2903 .1742 .4501
Participation (kt > 0) .4502 .6123 .7811 1.735
Share E[ktFkt > 0] .9712 .9748 .9687 .9975
Low FK ( ft < 25) .5382 .3665 .2092 .3888
Data (PSID)
Median wealth 101,872 193,392 365,392 3.587
Wealth-to-income ratio 3.21 4.99 7.695 2.40
Fraction poor (at < 2yt) .3478 .3039 .1588 .4565
Participation (kt > 0) .2817 .6289 .7538 2.676
Share E[ktFkt > 0] .5834 .5231 .5787 .9919
Note.—This table summarizes outcomes from baseline simulations at age 65 compared
to actual observed outcomes in the PSID. The last column shows the ratio of college1 to
high school dropout values for each row (2004 dollars). Average income is average simu-
lated lifetime income. A poor household is defined as a household that has less than twice
its income in accumulated wealth. Participation denotes the fraction who invest in the
technology, and the share denotes the average share of wealth invested in the technology
for those who invest in the technology. Finally, those with low financial knowledge are
those with fewer than 25 units of financial knowledge. (Additional detail is provided in
the online appendix.)
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all households can obtain the same returns if they participate. As we show
later, it is the endogenous mechanism of financial knowledge that allows
us to generate large differences in participation. Although the model
predicts the dispersion in participation rates well, it captures the share
of wealth invested in the technology less well. The reason is that the
model predicts that those who use sophisticated saving technologies at
retirement will have invested nearly all their assets in it, whereas in the
data, the share is closer to 60 percent. Nevertheless, the simulations are
consistent with the data in that there is little heterogeneity across educa-
tion groups in terms of the share invested in the technology. As we show
in an extension below, an alternative formulation for preferences allows
us to better match the share invested in the technology (Epstein and Zin
1989).
We have also computed the fraction of simulated consumers with low
financial knowledge (low FK) at the time of retirement. Given the pro-
duction function for knowledge, a threshold of 25 units implies that such
households could expect an annual excess return of only 1 percentage
point or less. In our model, such a low level of financial knowledge turns
out to be optimal for many, given the constraints and shocks that individ-
uals face. These “optimally ignorant” individuals include 54 percent of
the high school dropouts, 37 percent of the high school graduates, and
21 percent of college1. Since financial knowledge strongly influences
participation in the sophisticated technology, it is perhaps not surprising
that almost all of those with a financial knowledge level of over 25 do use
the technology. In this way, financial knowledge can be seen as a type of
entry cost, allowing users to deploy the technology effectively. This het-
erogeneous entry cost is endogenous, and it varies by education group
since incentives to invest in financial knowledge also differ.
Figure 4 depicts simulated life cycle paths of average financial knowl-
edge by education groups, all of which prove to be hump-shaped. Dur-
ing the accumulation phase, better-educated consumers invest more
in financial knowledge because they have more to gain from higher re-
turns that help them smooth lifetime marginal utilities. At some point,
the opportunity cost of investing becomes too large in terms of forgone
consumption and depreciation, and the marginal benefit decreases be-
cause of the shorter horizon over which individuals can enjoy the returns
from the investments. For these reasons, financial knowledge peaks around
age 65 and declines thereafter. This pattern differs from what was found
by Agarwal et al. (2009), who report that people make the best financial
decisions around age 53. One explanation for this difference is that we
do not allow for the rate of depreciation to depend on age, for example,
because of declining cognitive ability.
The present value of average expenditures on financial knowledge
over the life cycle, using a 4 percent discount rate (which is also the pref-
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erence discount rate), is $9,275 for high school dropouts, $14,442 for
high school graduates, and $19,608 for the college1 (in 2004 dollars).
Undiscounted, these figures are $25,882, $38,397, and $51,954 for the
same three groups. Decreasing the depreciation rate of knowledge de-
creases expenditures on financial knowledge: for instance, with a 3 per-
cent depreciation rate (vs. the baseline 6 percent), the present value of
expenditures on knowledge drops for each group ($7,758, $11,460, and
$14,142, respectively). However, with a 9 percent depreciation rate, the
present value of expenditures on knowledge is mostly higher than in the
baseline ($9,250, $15,031, and $22,458).
FIG. 4.—Simulated average levels of and expenditures on financial knowledge (FK).
These figures report average levels of financial knowledge ft as well as average annual ex-
penditures on financial knowledge p(it), by age and education levels. See also figure 1.
optimal financial knowledge and wealth inequality 455
This content downloaded from 130.091.050.029 on September 08, 2017 09:24:30 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
A. Quantitative Importance of Endogenous
Financial Knowledge
1. Decomposition Analysis
Our model embodies several differences across education groups that
generate differential wealth accumulation patterns. First, the consump-
tion floor acts as a tax on saving for those most likely to experience a
substantial negative income shock, since subsistence benefits are means-
tested (Hubbard et al. 1995). Second, differences in replacement rates,
demographics, and mortality patterns can create differential incentives
to save. Finally, there is the mechanism we propose: financial knowledge,
which creates a positive relationship between normalized wealth and in-
come. To clarify the relative contribution of each mechanism in the life
cycle model, we next describe the decomposition exercise depicted in
figure 5.
To this end, we recall that the ratio of median wealth to income for the
college1 group to that of high school dropouts was 2.45 at retirement in
our baseline (and 2.41 in the PSID data). As a contrast, we next eliminate
the possibility of accumulating knowledge along with all differences
across education groups other than incomewhile working, as well asmed-
ical expenditure differences. For this alternative, we fix all constraints to
those of high school graduates and eliminate the consumption floor. The
top bar of figure 5 provides the result: it shows that in a setup with only
income and medical expenditure uncertainty, the wealth-to-income ratio
of the college1 group is close to that of dropouts, the ratio of the two be-
ing 0.87. In other words, confirming what we noted at the outset, the ba-
sic life cycle model without extensions predicts that all groups accumu-
late wealth in roughly the same proportion to income.
Next we reintroduce the consumption floor, which reduces precau-
tionary savings of high school dropouts by more than that of the col-
lege1. As illustrated, this does raise the wealth-to-income ratio for the
college1 versus high school dropouts, but the impact is small, boosting
it to only 0.976 (the second bar in fig. 5). In other words, in our model
the consumption floor plays a relatively inconsequential role in generating
wealth inequality. This finding differs from that of Hubbard et al. (1995)
because our precautionary saving motive is much smaller than theirs as
a result of lower risk aversion.
Reintroducing differences in old-age income replacement rates is im-
portant since the college educated have much lower replacement rates
under the Social Security system than do high school dropouts. More-
over, this change alters both wealth accumulation and lifetime income
patterns; the net effect, of course, depends on the substitutability of re-
tirement wealth and private wealth. The third bar in figure 5 represents
this simulation, which raises inequality by 30 percent (from 0.976 to
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1.289). Introducing differences in demographics (the fourth bar down)
contributes a smaller increase in the ratio, of 0.13. What this means is
that differences in replacement rates in our model are more influential
than differences in household composition. Accounting for mortality
differences (the fifth bar) again increases the ratio, now to 1.815. The
reason is that college-educated households must finance consumption
over a longer horizon, while high school dropouts face a shorter hori-
zon. This is the amount of inequality generated using a life cycle model
that lacks endogenous financial knowledge.
The last bar in figure 5 shows what happens when we reintroduce the
possibility of investing in financial knowledge, in addition to the other
factors mentioned above. The impact of allowing consumers to access
the sophisticated technology and earn higher expected returns is strik-
FIG. 5.—Decomposition of wealth inequality at retirement. This figure reports simulated
median wealth divided by average lifetime income, expressed as a ratio of the college1 to
high school dropouts (<HS). The top bar accounts only for differences in uncertain life-
time income and medical expenditures; all other sources of heterogeneity are set to the
parameters of those who completed high school (HS). Subsequent bars then progressively
add mechanisms that can generate dispersion in wealth-to-lifetime average income ratios.
The second bar adds a consumption floor. For the third bar, we add differences in replace-
ment rates by education group. The fourth bar includes differences in household size over
the life cycle. The fifth bar incorporates mortality differences by education. The final bar
adds the impact of financial knowledge accumulation. For comparison, the PSID wealth-to-
income ratio (table 2) is 2.45. See figure 1 and the text for definitions. (Additional detail is
provided in the online appendix.)
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ing. Now the wealth-to-income ratio across education groups rises from
1.815 to 2.45. Thus, of all the explanations examined here for heteroge-
neity in wealth outcomes, financial knowledge accounts for just over 40 per-
cent of the cross-group wealth inequality: 0:406 5 0:64=ð2:45 2 0:877Þ.
We have also investigated how far one gets with only initial differences
in financial knowledge. To do so, we took differences in financial knowl-
edge at age 25 as reported in the NFCS and shut down endogenous ac-
cumulation of financial knowledge over the life cycle (in this scenario,
individuals cannot invest in financial knowledge, so the initial differences
remain constant over the life cycle). Results show that this adds very lit-
tle to wealth inequality, suggesting that endogenous financial knowledge
is essential if we are to generate the large difference in wealth accumula-
tion we see empirically.20
To more fully illustrate the impact of having access to the higher re-
turns as a result of investing in financial knowledge, an additional simple
counterfactual exercise is useful. For each education group, we first com-
pute average simulated consumption, investment, and medical expendi-
tures by age. Then we evaluate the average return factor for each educa-
tion group by age using its accumulated financial knowledge, and we
compare this to the average wealth path that would be generated if all
groups could earn only the average return earned by high school drop-
outs. This exercise reveals that wealth would have been 41 percent lower
for the college1 at the time of retirement had they experienced the re-
turns paid to high school dropouts; for high school graduates, the decline
would have been just over 30 percent compared to the paths using their
actual average rates of return. Since rates of return differ by roughly 1 per-
cent between educationgroups, these differences compoundedovermany
years produce substantial differences in wealth holdings. Moreover, our
model generates this wealth inequality endogenously building on differ-
ences in marginal utilities of consumption over the life cycle.
2. Alternative Preference Specifications
In this section we offer additional observations regarding the preference
structure used in our model. First, we have thus far assumed CRRA. By
contrast, allowing risk aversion to decrease with wealth could help ex-
plain why those with college education invest more in the technology,
and decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA) could then generate addi-
tional wealth inequality. Empirical evidence on the relationship between
risk aversion and wealth is, however, mixed. On the one hand, Brunner-
meier and Nagel (2008) and Chiappori and Paiella (2011) could not re-
ject the assumption of CRRA. On the other hand, Calvet and Sodini
20 Detailed results of this simulation are reported in the online appendix.
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(2014) found rather compelling evidence of DRRA using administrative
data on twins from Sweden. A common way of modeling DRRA is to as-
sume a subsistence level of consumption, f, such that utility is given by
uðcÞ 5 ðc 2 fÞ12j=ð1 2 jÞ. This subsistence level must be feasible at the
lower bound of cash on hand. But in a model with uncertain income and
medical expenditures, the lower bound for cash on hand can be close to
zero or negative. This is one reason for having a consumption floor close
to that offered by existing transfer programs. Accordingly, to allow for
DRRA, we must set the subsistence level below the consumption floor.
This lowers the potential for DRRA to generate high wealth inequality.
In addition, because j governs both risk aversion and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, a decreasing risk aversion implies increasing
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Hence, the effect of this prefer-
ence specification on wealth accumulation and wealth inequality is am-
biguous.
Moreover, in a world with CRRA preferences, risk aversion has two ef-
fects on people’s willingness to invest in the technology. On the one
hand, agents are less willing to invest in the technology as risk aversion
increases. On the other, they may want to accumulate more wealth for
precautionary reasons that could increase their demand for the technol-
ogy (Haliassos and Michaelides 2003). We conducted two simulations
fixing the subsistence level of consumption at 75 percent and 90 percent
of the consumption floor set by transfer programs.21 Compared to the
baseline scenario, where the observed ratio of normalized wealth be-
tween college1 and high school dropouts was 2.45, DRRA lowers wealth
inequality to 1.81 and 1.6, respectively. Nevertheless, financial knowledge
increased wealth inequality by roughly the same magnitudes in these
scenarios, compared to scenarios without financial knowledge but with
DRRA.
A second point has to do with how we model preference heterogene-
ity. Our baseline scenario assumed that preferences are the same across
education groups (see the first panel of fig. 6). While preference hetero-
geneity may offer an alternative explanation for observed behavior, two
facts suggest that building in heterogeneity consistent with experimental
evidence would reinforce results from our baseline scenario. First, there
is mounting evidence that financial knowledge itself is related to returns,
risk diversification, and consumption growth (Calvet, Campbell, and
Sodini 2007; Jappelli and Padula 2013; Clark et al. 2015). Hence wealth
inequality cannot simply be an expression of preference heterogeneity,
though preference heterogeneity could explain wealth inequality through
our proposed mechanism of endogenous financial knowledge. Second,
21 Detailed results are reported in the online appendix.
optimal financial knowledge and wealth inequality 459
This content downloaded from 130.091.050.029 on September 08, 2017 09:24:30 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
F
IG
.
6
.—
Si
m
u
la
te
d
li
fe
cy
cl
e
w
ea
lt
h
an
d
fr
ac
ti
o
n
o
f
w
ea
lt
h
in
ve
st
ed
in
th
e
so
p
h
is
ti
ca
te
d
te
ch
n
o
lo
gy
w
it
h
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
s.
T
h
es
e
fi
gu
re
s
tr
ac
e
th
e
sh
ar
e
o
f
w
ea
lt
h
in
ve
st
ed
in
th
e
te
ch
n
o
lo
gy
an
d
m
ed
ia
n
w
ea
lt
h
b
y
ag
e
an
d
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
u
n
d
er
th
re
e
sc
en
ar
io
s.
T
h
e
to
p
p
an
el
re
fe
rs
to
o
u
r
b
as
el
in
e
sc
en
ar
io
,t
h
e
m
id
d
le
p
an
el
al
lo
w
s
fo
r
h
et
er
o
ge
n
ei
ty
in
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s,
an
d
th
e
b
o
tt
o
m
p
an
el
as
su
m
es
E
p
st
ei
n
-Z
in
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s.
Se
e
al
so
th
e
te
xt
an
d
fi
gu
re
1
fo
r
d
efi
n
it
io
n
s.
(A
d
d
it
io
n
al
d
et
ai
l
is
p
ro
vi
d
ed
in
th
e
o
n
li
n
e
ap
p
en
d
ix
.)
This content downloaded from 130.091.050.029 on September 08, 2017 09:24:30 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
the evidence on preference heterogeneity suggests that better-educated
households are both more patient (Lawrance 1991; Harrison, Lau, and
Williams 2002) and less risk averse (Barsky et al. 1997; Kapteyn and Teppa
2011). Accordingly, they would be more inclined to invest in knowledge,
which tends to increase rather than decrease the role played by financial
knowledge. The second panel of figure 6 shows what happens in our
model when high school graduates have the same preferences as in the
baseline (b5 0.96, j5 1.6), but the college1 group is allowed to bemore
patient and less risk averse (b 5 0.97, j 5 1.4), and dropouts are more
impatient and more risk averse (b 5 0.95, j 5 1.8). Compared to the
baseline scenario (top panels), wealth inequality is amplified.
Another interesting feature of our model is the hump-shaped profile
of participation in the sophisticated technology. In ourmodel, the young
have lowwealth and financial knowledge, which translates into low partic-
ipation in the sophisticated technology. This type of behavior is hard to
capture in traditional models (for a review, see Guiso and Sodini [2013]).
A final observation regards the intertemporal separability of the utility
function and the link between the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution and risk aversion. The power utility formulation generates a pre-
dicted share of wealth invested in the technology of close to one, which
may exaggerate the importance of financial knowledge in explaining
wealth inequality. For this reason, we have also considered Epstein-Zin
preferences in an alternative scenario by specifying the value function
as follows:
Vt 5 max
ct
ne,tðct=ne,tÞ121=w 1 bpe,tEt V 12jt11
 ð121=wÞ=ð12jÞn o1=ð121=wÞ
,
where w is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and j is risk aver-
sion. This function collapses to the CRRA function if 1=w 5 j. We use
1=w 5 1:6 and j 5 4. The choice of w is guided by a meta-analysis by
Havranek et al. (2015) reporting a mean value of 0.6 across 1,429 US
studies. The choice of j is guided by evidence of Barksy et al. (1997),
who found values for 1/j close to 0.25. The third panel of figure 6 dis-
plays our results. Not surprisingly, now we find lower shares invested
in the technology, driven by a decrease in the conditional shares (share
of wealth invested in the technology for those who invest in the technol-
ogy). As of retirement age, the conditional share is close to 0.6, which
matches with what we observe in the PSID (table 1). Yet the conditional
shares do not vary considerably across education groups, and as a result,
wealth inequality remains high. We recomputed results depicted in fig-
ure 5 and conclude that with Epstein-Zin preferences, the share of wealth
inequality explained by financial knowledge is still large, namely, 33 per-
cent. Hence, although this preference formulation does allow us to bet-
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ter match the share of wealth invested in the technology, it does not affect
our key conclusion about the role of financial knowledge in generating
an important share of wealth inequality.
In sum, our baseline model using homogeneous CRRA preferences
does a relatively good job of accounting for wealth inequality, without
having to impose additional preference heterogeneity or more complex
preferences. Since these extensions provide rather similar results, we re-
tain our baseline formulation for welfare and policy analysis in the re-
mainder of the paper.
B. Optimality
To illustrate the impact of having access to financial knowledge onwealth
distributions, we compare what optimal wealth would be at retirement
(age 65) in our baseline world in which people can invest in financial
knowledge with an otherwise identical world in which such investment
is infeasible. To this end, figure 7 illustrates a scatter plot of simulated
wealth targets given the two different environments, for individuals who
face the same income shocks and initial conditions. If household wealth
holdings were equivalent in the two scenarios, they would lie along the
45-degree line. Conversely, those appearing above the 45-degree line accu-
mulate less wealth when they can invest in knowledge versus not, whereas
those below the line do better given access to financial knowledge. The
curved line gives a nonparametric plot of the median values of optimal
wealth in the two scenarios. The distribution of the cloud of points indi-
cates that having access to financial knowledge generates far more wealth
heterogeneity than an economy without such a possibility.
The figure provides an interesting perspective for assessing whether
households are optimally prepared for retirement. For example, using
a model similar to ours but without financial knowledge, Scholz et al.
(2006) derived optimal wealth targets at the time of retirement. They
then examinedHRSdata and concluded that close to 80 percent of Amer-
ican households accumulated sufficient wealth for retirement, while
some 20 percent were underprepared. By contrast, the wealth distribu-
tion in our baseline model closely resembles that observed in the data,
suggesting that some proportion of households donot achieve wealth tar-
gets as a result of imperfect knowledge. Nevertheless, this is optimal given
the constraints they face. Moreover, those who might appear to be “ill-
prepared” in our simulations are the less educated and least financially
knowledgeable, usually as a result of large income shocks experienced
early in the life cycle. Again, this pattern conforms to our model’s theo-
retical predictions.
462 journal of political economy
This content downloaded from 130.091.050.029 on September 08, 2017 09:24:30 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Table 3 offers a different perspective, namely, a comparison of our
baseline scenario key outcomes with those from a counterfactual in which
all consumers are endowed with perfect financial knowledge at the out-
set. In particular, we again simulate outcomes for individuals who face
the same income shocks and initial conditions; the top panel replicates our
baseline, while the lower panel endows everyone with complete financial
knowledge when they enter the labor market. We compare these two out-
comes using a welfare measure that evaluates the percentage change in
permanent consumption that a consumer in our baseline would need in
order to make him as well off as in the world with perfect knowledge. For
high school dropouts, the change in lifetime permanent consumption is
around 1.9 percent, whereas for the two more educated groups, lifetime
consumption would be 2.7 percent higher.
FIG. 7.—Comparison of simulated predicted wealth at retirement: base case and sce-
nario without financial knowledge (FK). This figure reports simulated wealth targets at re-
tirement (age 65, in thousands of dollars) under two scenarios for the same individuals
(same income shocks and initial conditions). The first scenario (wealth target with FK)
is generated using the baseline in which individuals can invest in financial knowledge if
it is optimal to do so. The second scenario (wealth target without FK) assumes that individ-
uals cannot invest in financial knowledge. Each dot represents a pair of simulated wealth
targets. The 45-degree line is plotted as well. Individuals above the 45-degree line have ac-
cumulated less wealth under the FK scenario than under the scenario without FK, and vice
versa. We also plot a nonparametric estimate of the relationship between the two targets
(dotted line).
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C. Varying Parameters for Preferences, Knowledge Costs,
Depreciation, and Financial Knowledge Production
We next provide a rich set of sensitivity analyses to help assess how results
might change when important parameters are varied. Table 4 provides re-
sults for the baseline case (in the first row), as well as outcomes in which
we vary one parameter at a time. In all cases, we report simulated out-
comes for the high school dropouts (col. 1) along with the ratio of simu-
lated outcomes at retirement for the college1 versus the high school
dropouts. Column 2 uses wealth-to-income values at retirement; column 3
reports the fraction investing in the sophisticated technology at retire-
ment; and column 4 depicts the fraction with low financial knowledge at
retirement. (Additional simulation results for parameters in table 4 ap-
pear in the online appendix.)
1. Preferences
We first vary the relative risk aversion parameter j from 1.2 to 2.0 (span-
ning the baseline value of 1.6). Not surprisingly, this has an important
impact on resulting wealth inequality, as well as on the fraction investing
in the sophisticated technology and the fraction with low knowledge.
Specifically, when risk aversion is low (j 5 1.2), wealth of the dropouts
TABLE 3
A Comparison of Baseline Results versus Those from a Model
with Perfect Financial Knowledge (FK)
< High School High School College1
Ratio (College1/
< High School)
Baseline
Median wealth 94,746 177,391 346,805 3.66
Wealth-to-income ratio 2.981 4.583 7.303 2.45
Fraction poor (wt < 2yt) .387 .2903 .1742 .4501
Participation (kt > 0) .4502 .6123 .7811 1.735
Perfect FK
Median wealth 173,150 282,963 436,800 2.523
Wealth-to-income ratio 5.448 7.311 9.199 1.688
Fraction poor (wt < 2yt) .2525 .1429 .07364 .2917
Participation (kt > 0) .7919 .8865 .9282 1.172
Welfare (% baseline c) .019 .027 .027
Note.—This table compares simulated outcomes from the baseline scenario, compared
to a model in which households are endowed with complete financial knowledge at the
point of entering the labor market. Wealth-to-income ratio denotes the ratio of median
wealth to average lifetime income. A household is defined as poor if it has accumulated
less than twice its income at the time of retirement. The welfare measure evaluates the per-
centage change in permanent consumption that would be equivalent to the change in ex-
pected utility at age 25 under the perfect knowledge scenario. (Additional detail is provided
in the online appendix.)
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falls and inequality is amplified relative to the baseline. When the inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution is large, individuals are more sensitive
to rates of return. Better-educated people are willing to invest in finan-
cial knowledge and defer consumption. Such complementarity substan-
tially increases the dispersion of wealth across educational groups, such
that the degree of inequality increases by about one-third: 36 percent 5
(3.332/2.45)2 1. In contrast, setting j to 2 produces the opposite result:
the precautionary saving motive is now more important, so all groups ac-
cumulate more wealth and therefore have added incentives to invest in
financial knowledge and participate in sophisticated products. Accord-
ingly, in a cross-sectional context, our model implies that more risk-
averse individuals would invest more in financial knowledge and are
more likely to use the sophisticated technology. This feature, which is
present in a number of prior papers (e.g., Gomes and Michaelides
TABLE 4
Sensitivity Analysis for Preference and Cost Parameters
and Production Function
Level (< High School) Ratio (College1/< High School)
Wealth-to-Income
(1)
Wealth-to-Income
(2)
Participation
(3)
Low FK
(4)
Baseline 2.98 2.45 1.735 .388
j 5 1.2 2.02 3.332 1.851 .4182
j 5 2.0 3.75 2.118 1.648 .3633
b 5 .95 1.99 2.308 1.904 .528
b 5 .97 4.50 2.249 1.502 .2785
d 5 .03 3.33 2.285 1.478 .2994
d 5 .09 2.50 2.509 1.986 .4884
p0 5 25 3.65 2.215 1.458 .2777
p0 5 75 2.50 2.487 2.05 .4702
p1 5 1.25 4.32 1.942 1.427 .2362
p1 5 2 2.49 2.446 2.079 .4628
cd 5 1,000 2.82 2.487 1.811 .4163
cd 5 500 3.04 2.456 1.61 .3698
a1 5 .9 3.01 2.43 1.679 .3824
a1 5 .75 3.02 2.45 1.547 .3936
a1 5 .5 3.18 2.351 1.471 .3581
Note.—Each row reports the ratio of college1 to <HS outcomes as of age 65 for the case
in which we vary the single parameter indicated vs. the baseline case. Baseline values as re-
ported in the text are relative risk aversion (j5 1.6), financial knowledge depreciation rate
(d 5 0.06), investment production function (pðiÞ 5 50i1:75), participation cost (cd 5 750),
and discount factor (b 5 0.96). In the final three rows we alter the elasticity of returns to
financial knowledge (a1), which is implicitly equal to one in the baseline. Column 1 reports
the ratio of normalized median wealth of the college1 group to the median of the <HS
group. Both are normalized by average lifetime income. The participation ratio denotes
the fraction of college1 individuals participating in the technology divided by the same
fraction for the <HS group. Column 4 reports the same ratio for only those individuals with
fewer than 25 units of financial knowledge (low FK). See table 1 and the text for defini-
tions. (Additional detail is provided in the online appendix.)
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2005), has to do with the fact that raising the degree of risk aversion typ-
ically boosts precautionary wealth and pushes individuals over the partic-
ipation threshold. This effect dominates the direct effect of risk aversion
on risk taking, which would imply less participation in the sophisticated
technology. Overall, higher risk aversion reduces wealth inequality and
reduces the correlation between education and financial knowledge.
Considering time preference, we find that wealth inequality is relatively
insensitive to changes in the discount factor, b, set initially to a value of 0.96.
2. Cost of Investing in Knowledge
The next two lines in table 4 illustrate that results change relatively little
when we vary the depreciation rate for financial knowledge, d, from the
baseline level of 0.06 to a low of 0.03 and a high of 0.09 (holding other
factors constant). Wealth inequality changes are small, on the order of
2 percent. The higher depreciation rate generates less wealth heteroge-
neity because the college1 group cuts back on financial knowledge in-
vestments, and relatively more in this set fall into the low knowledge cate-
gory than at baseline.
The next four rows indicate how results depend on the production
function for financial knowledge, p(i). It will be recalled that the base-
line representation of this function pðitÞ 5 50i1:75t had two parameters:
the multiplicand affects the average cost of acquiring financial knowl-
edge, while the exponent influences the function’s convexity. We vary
both in table 4, in turn. Varying the multiplicand from its baseline value
of 50 to a low of 25 and a high of 75 has a relatively small impact on the
results. By contrast, changing the function’s convexity has a nonlinear
effect. Increasing convexity gives larger incentives to spread investment
over the life cycle and to avoid large investments; hence, this should
lower differences in financial knowledge. Nevertheless, raising convexity
also increases the average cost of reaching a certain level of financial
knowledge, which could amplify differences as college-educated house-
holds have more resources. The net effect we observe is not monotonic,
as inequality first rises (from 1.942 to 2.45) and then falls slightly (from
2.45 to 2.446). The next two rows of table 4 change the fixed cost of par-
ticipation in the sophisticated technology, cd. Varying cd around the base-
line value of $750 has relatively little impact on wealth-to-income ratios,
along with the other two outcomes.
3. Production of Financial Knowledge
To further assess how the financial knowledge production function can
shape wealth dispersion, we next examine a production different from
that in the baseline setup. Consider the following function:
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r ft11ð Þ 5 a0 f a1t11:
Here a1 is the elasticity of risk-adjusted returns to financial knowledge.
We lack evidence on rates of return at the household level, since little
is known about this elasticity. Instead, we use a plausible range from
the human capital literature (Browning, Hansen, and Heckman 1999),
namely, 0.5 to 0.9, and we consider three elasticity values: low (a1 5
0.5), medium (a1 5 0.75), and high (a1 5 0.9). The final three rows
of table 4 report the ratio of the college1 to <HSmedian wealth for each
of these scenarios. The results show that when the production function
is more concave, less dispersion in income-to-wealth ratios is generated.
For example, a high elasticity of 0.9 leaves inequality virtually unchanged
(2.43). An elasticity of 0.75, at the midrange of the human capital liter-
ature, yields a ratio of 2.45, while a lower-bound elasticity of 0.5 yields a
value of 2.351. It is worth noting that even our lowest value of 2.351 rep-
resents considerably more wealth inequality than results from a model
without financial knowledge (1.815). Accordingly, more concavity in the
knowledge production function attenuates the wealth inequality created
by financial knowledge. Allowing for a concave production function with
plausible elasticities instead of a linear function still implies a substantial
role for financial knowledge.
An alternative to our approach to investment in financial knowledge is
a “learning-by-doing” formulation, where individuals can invest in knowl-
edge only according to the following process: ft11 5 ð1 2 dÞft 1 fI ðkt > 0Þ.
Figure 8 plots profiles for two values of f: (5, 10). We cannot distinguish
learning by doing from direct investment in financial knowledge empir-
ically, as that would require nonexistent panel data on financial knowl-
edge and portfolio choices. Nevertheless, it is clear that once again, wealth
inequality is strongly influenced by financial knowledge, and the result-
ing patterns of participation in the sophisticated technology and median
wealth patterns are again consistent with empirical patterns depicted above.
Additionally, this formulation does not generate as much inequality as in
our baseline formulation.
In a final sensitivity analysis regarding the production function, we
briefly explore the impact of allowing financial knowledge not only to raise
the expected return on the sophisticated technology but also to lower the
variance of returns. Although more educated individuals may take more
risk by investing more in sophisticated products, they may be able to bet-
ter diversify their portfolios, thus reducing unsystematic risk. The base-
line specification captures the first aspect (risk taking increases with ed-
ucation), but it does not capture the second: diversification. To assess the
latter’s likely importance, we set the standard deviation of returns as
jð ft Þ 5 jmax 2 vft with jmax 5 0:25 with v fixed such that jð100Þ 5 0:16.
Hence, an investor without knowledge would do significantly worse than
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the market, perhaps by picking individual stocks. As he becomes perfectly
knowledgeable, his portfolio achieves the same degree of diversification
as themarket index. Not surprisingly, participation in the technology and
wealth is higher for all groups, yet wealth inequality increases only slightly.
The ratio of normalized wealth increases slightly to 2.52, versus 2.45 in the
baseline scenario (fig. 9).
In sum, the sensitivity analyses confirm that treating financial knowl-
edge as an investment in human capital generates wealth inequality con-
sistent with the data. The quantitative importance of financial knowl-
edge for wealth inequality does vary somewhat with parameter values,
but the amount of variability in inequality explained by endogenously
generated financial knowledge remains high across a wide range of pa-
rameter values and processes. Figures 8 and 9 again both illustrate a
hump-shaped profile of participation over the life cycle, which is a note-
worthy feature of our model and is robust to alternative specifications
of the production function.
D. Policy Simulations
In the real world, several institutional factors can help shape the process
of financial knowledge accumulation. For instance, Social Security ben-
efits may crowd out household saving and also discourage the accumu-
lation of financial knowledge. Similarly, means-tested benefits protect
consumers against bad states of nature and reduce the need to save: hav-
ing such programsmay provide a disincentive to invest in financial knowl-
edge. To explore the relative importance of each, we next undertake
two policy simulations and compare results to the baseline findings. In
the first case, we examine the impact of a reduction in means-tested ben-
efits by half, which could mean either that generosity is decreased or that
eligibility is restricted. In the second case, we reduce expected retire-
ment benefits by 20 percent, reflective of what the Social Security system
may be able to pay future retirees unless program revenues are substan-
tially increased (Cogan and Mitchell 2003). Results appear in table 5,
where the first panel reproduces baseline results for ease of comparison.
Our first scenario halves the means-tested consumption floor from
$10,000 to $5,000 per year. As is clear from the second panel of table 5,
this boosts incentives to save for precautionary reasons. But because our
precautionary saving motive is less important than in other studies, such
a policy change does not generate large effects in terms of wealth accu-
mulation or financial knowledge. That is, both wealth and knowledge
rise following the benefit reduction, but the impact is relatively similar
across education groups. Accordingly, in this model, means-tested benefits
optimal financial knowledge and wealth inequality 469
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do not appear to be an important factor shaping saving and investment in
financial knowledge.
An alternative scenario reduces Social Security income benefits by
one-fifth, and this does produce a substantial increase in wealth for all
educational groups compared to the baseline (see the third panel of ta-
ble 5). Median assets rise by one-third (32 percent) for dropouts, and
they rise by roughly one-fifth (19 percent) for the college1. Lowering
retirement income generosity thus reduces wealth inequality instead of
increasing it. We can also compute the change in the present value of re-
tirement income by education group in this scenario. Expressing the
change as a fraction of the change in the expected present value of retire-
ment income yields an estimate of the displacement or crowd-out effect
of retirement income. A simple life cyclemodel would predict a complete
offset once adjustment is made for the fact that wealth is measured at the
time of retirement, so the reduction in lifetime income is only partially
offset by that age. By contrast, the unadjusted displacement effects in
TABLE 5
Simulation Results of Policy Experiments
< High School High School College1
Ratio (College/
< High School)
Baseline
Median wealth 94,746 177,391 346,805 3.66
Wealth-to-income ratio 2.981 4.583 7.303 2.45
Fraction poor (at < 2yt) .387 .2903 .1742 .4501
Participation (kt > 0) .4502 .6123 .7811 1.735
Low FK ( ft < 25) .5382 .3665 .2092 .3888
Reduced Floor (cmin)
Median wealth 108,783 191,395 360,725 3.316
Wealth-to-income ratio 3.423 4.945 7.597 2.219
Fraction poor (at < 2yt) .3555 .271 .1585 .4458
Participation (kt > 0) .4655 .6181 .766 1.645
Low FK ( ft < 25) .515 .3492 .192 .3728
Reduced Retirement Income
Median wealth 125,194 235,167 412,369 3.294
Wealth-to-income ratio 4.077 6.302 9.011 2.21
Fraction poor (at < 2yt) .2907 .1771 .08989 .3092
Participation (kt > 0) .485 .6613 .798 1.645
Low FK ( ft < 25) .485 .2997 .1549 .3194
Note.—This table summarizes outcomes from simulations at retirement age. The first
panel replicates our baseline scenario; the second lowers means-tested benefits from
$10,000 to $5,000; and the third lowers retirement income by 20 percent. A poor house-
hold is defined as one with less than twice its income in accumulated wealth. Participation
denotes the fraction who invest in the sophisticated technology. Those with low financial
knowledge are those with fewer than 25 units of financial knowledge. See the text; addi-
tional details are provided in the online appendix.
optimal financial knowledge and wealth inequality 471
This content downloaded from 130.091.050.029 on September 08, 2017 09:24:30 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
our simulations range from 20.784 to 21.15.22 The percentage of drop-
outs who face shortfalls as a result of having assets below twice their cur-
rent income falls by 25 percent, with an even larger change among the
best educated. All groups boost their holdings of the sophisticated tech-
nology, and evenmore interestingly, the fraction of optimally ignorant re-
spondents falls. In other words, since all consumers must now save for re-
tirement, investment in financial knowledge rises across the board. Of
course, this comes at a cost: the present value of investment expenditures
rises by about $1,000 for dropouts and $2,000 for high school and the col-
lege educated.23
In sum, we have shown that the economic environment affects invest-
ment in knowledge, which in turn drives wealth accumulation patterns.24
Moreover, a learning-by-doing approach leaves our results qualitatively
unchanged, though it does not match the data as well as our preferred
specification.
VII. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper has developed an augmented stochastic life cycle model that
endogenizes the decision to acquire financial knowledge so as to explore
the forces that shape financial knowledge accumulation over the life-
time and to evaluate how much wealth inequality might be attributable
to differences in financial knowledge. Our formulation posits that peo-
ple can invest in sophisticated financial technology generating higher
expected returns, though it is costly to acquire and depreciates with time.
Most importantly, we show that allowing for endogenous financial knowl-
edge generates large differences in wealth holdings: specifically, we find
that 30–40 percent of US wealth inequality can potentially be attributed
to financial knowledge. The profile of optimal financial knowledge proves
to be hump-shaped over the life cycle, and it also differs by educational
groups because of differences in life cycle income paths. Accordingly,
our model can also account for a sizable share of observed differences
in wealth across education groups, while other authors have had to rely
22 These numbers are computed as the change in wealth at retirement divided by the
change in the present value of retirement income when we reduce the generosity of pen-
sions. We use a discount rate of 4 percent for these calculations.
23 These present values are computed using simulated data on financial knowledge in-
vestment over the life cycle, the cost function, and a discount rate of 4 percent. The online
appendix presents additional results for table 5.
24 In a more realistic context that allowed for heterogeneity in the cost of acquiring
knowledge, some individuals might not react to a reduction in retirement benefits by in-
vesting in financial knowledge and accumulating more wealth. For this reason, our policy
simulations should be interpreted keeping this caveat in mind.
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on heterogeneous preference patterns or means-tested social programs
to generate wealth dispersion.
In generating wealth inequality above and beyond what traditional
models of saving have delivered, we rationalize some of the large differ-
ences in wealth found inmuch prior empirical work on saving. Our results
do not rely on individuals having misperceptions about future returns or
other behavioral biases. Instead, our model rests on the important and in-
tuitively sensible fact that individuals do not start their economic lives with
full financial knowledge; rather, financial knowledge is acquired endoge-
nously over the life cycle. Moreover, the model does not require differen-
tial abilities to acquire financial knowledge or different preferences, so this
parsimonious parameterization helps clearly indicate the contribution of
endogenous financial knowledge to wealth inequality. We also show that
some level of financial ignorance may actually be optimal: inasmuch as it
is expensive to acquire financial knowledge and not everyone benefits
from greater financial sophistication, some consumers will rationally re-
main financially ignorant.
Incorporating this quite realistic mechanism can also yield interesting
policy predictions. For instance, nations promising higher levels of old-
age benefits would be expected to be those with lower levels of financial
knowledge in the population, while growing reliance on individually
managed 401(k) accounts should be accompanied by rising financial
knowledge. Moreover, the model can help explain low levels of financial
knowledge around the world, and it also rationalizes why some popula-
tion subgroups are ill-informed, particularly those anticipating larger
old-age social insurance benefits. It also offers insights about the poten-
tial effects of adding financial education programs in high school or the
workplace, as these can be modeled as lowering the cost of, or increasing
the endowment of, financial knowledge (naturally, a full analysis would
also require the measurement of program costs). And the model can
also inform policy makers regarding the timing of financial education
over the life cycle, in that the benefits of a longer horizon must be com-
pared against the costs of acquiring financial knowledge early, when the
marginal utility of consumption is higher and households are more likely
to face liquidity constraints. Finally, our model helps explain why finan-
cial education programs might not produce large behavioral changes,
particularly for people who find it suboptimal to invest in financial knowl-
edge. That is, a policy intended to raise financial knowledge early in life
might not have measurable long-term effects if consumers have both op-
timal financial knowledge and optimal target wealth levels in mind when
solving their life cycle problems. In other words, offering financial knowl-
edge can boost saving in the short run, but it might have little enduring
impact in terms of boosting lifetime wealth. In sum, incorporating en-
dogenous financial knowledge into a life cycle model has important im-
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plications for the economic understanding of how much consumers save
and invest over their lifetimes, as well as how they will invest.
Appendix
TABLE A1
Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Definition Value
j Relative risk aversion 1.6
b Discount factor .96
r Safe return .02
je Standard deviation returns .16
r( fmax) Maximum excess return .04
p0 Productivity of investment function (pðitÞ 5 p0ip1t ) 50
p1 Concavity of investment function 1.75
cd Participation cost 750
d Depreciation rate .06
cmin Consumption floor 10,000
ry Autocorrelation income .95
j2y,ε Variance innovation income (<HS, HS, college1) (.033, .025, .016)
ro Autocorrelation out-of-pocket .901
j2o,ε Variance innovation out-of-pocket (<HS, HS, college1) (.175, .156, .153)
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